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Abstract
This paper examines how parallel importation in°uences pharma-
ceutical innovation and the welfare of the economy, when crossnational
drug price di®erentials occur not only because of demand elasticity
based factors, but also governmental drug price control based factors.
By explicitly considering the governmental drug price control based
factors, this paper shows that parallel importation may enhance phar-
maceutical innovation, when the bargaining power of a foreign gov-
ernment is strong and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign
market is small. We also show that the increase in R&D induced by
parallel imports may even increase the consumer surplus of a country
with high demand elasticities and which could face relatively low drug
prices, if parallel imports were not allowed.
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1 Introduction
Recently, many economists have argued that high income countries should
prohibit parallel imports of drugs from low income countries (e.g. Kremer,
2002 and Danzon et al, 2003). A ban on parallel imports enables a phar-
maceutical company to set di®erent prices in di®erent markets according to
price elasticities of demand (\demand elasticity based price di®erentials").
Since demand elasticities are inversely related to income, the pro¯t maximiz-
ing pharmaceutical company sets lower (higher) drug prices in lower (higher)
income countries. Thus, a ban on parallel imports improves access to the
medicine in low income countries while it provides a greater incentive for
a product development to the pharmaceutical company, since it can allow
companies to capture closer to the full social surplus for their product.
These arguments implicitly assume that the crossnational drug price dif-
ferentials are mainly due to demand elasticity based factors. However, em-
pirical studies, such as that of Maskus (2001) and Scherer (2003), show that
there are many other complicated factors that explain observed crossnational
drug price di®erentials. In particular, governmental price control for phar-
maceutical products is known to be one of these crucial factors. Moreover,
it is also known that the form and extent of governmental price controls are
heavily in°uenced by the lobbying activities of pharmaceutical companies.
That is, the negotiation process between pharmaceutical companies and the
government. Therefore, suppose the crossnational drug price di®erentials are
mainly due to factors based on governmental price control; then, it is not self
evident that the ban on parallel imports of drugs really leads to increased
pharmaceutical innovation.
Focusing upon factors based on governmental price control in crossna-
tional drug price di®erentials, Pecorino (2002) reexamines the impact of par-
allel imports upon a pharmaceutical company's pro¯ts and R&D incentives.
In his model, one monopolist in the home country sells in both the domestic
and foreign markets. Since these two markets have identical demand elastici-
ties, the demand elasticity based price di®erentials never occur. The ¯rm can
freely set its domestic price. However, owing to governmental price control,
the foreign price is determined by the Nash bargaining game between the ¯rm
and the foreign government. In the No Reimport regime (NR regime), the
domestic government does not allow parallel imports of drugs. Thus, perfect
market segmentation is possible and the ¯rm charges its pro¯t maximiz-
ing price in the domestic market while the negotiated foreign price becomes
lower than in the domestic market. Therefore, under the NR regime, the
price di®erentials are purely due to factors based on the governmental price
control (\price control based price di®erentials"). In the Reimport regime
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(R regime), the domestic government allows parallel imports of drugs. Thus,
the law of one price holds and the negotiated foreign price also becomes the
domestic price as well (\uniform pricing e®ect"). This fact implies that the
negotiation results in°uence not only the pro¯ts from the foreign market, but
also the pro¯ts from the domestic markets under the R regime. Therefore, a
¯rm has an incentive to bargain harder under the R regime than under the
NR regime (\strengthened negotiation e®ect").
The comparison of the results under the NR regime and the R regime sug-
gests that parallel imports may provide the following two competing impacts
upon the ¯rm's pro¯ts and R&D incentives. First, parallel importation has
a negative impact upon the ¯rm's total pro¯ts through the \uniform pricing
e®ect" since it lowers the domestic price and the pro¯ts from the domestic
market. However, second, parallel importation has a positive impact upon
the ¯rm's total pro¯ts through the \strengthened negotiation e®ect" since
it increases the level of the uniform price in both the domestic and foreign
markets. Pecorino (2002) shows that the latter \strengthened negotiation
e®ect" always dominates the former \uniform pricing e®ect" under the plau-
sible speci¯cation of the demand function. Thus, parallel importation has
positive impacts upon the pharmaceutical company's pro¯ts and incentives
to invest in R&D.
These existing studies show that, if the di®erential pricing is purely de-
mand elasticity based, parallel importation reduces pharmaceutical innova-
tion. However, if the di®erential pricing is based on purely governmental price
control, parallel importation promotes pharmaceutical innovation. There-
fore, the purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical model that en-
ables us to analyze the cases where price di®erentials occur because of both
demand elasticities and negotiation based factors. Then, we analyze more
extensively under what economic environments parallel importation leads to
increased or decreased pharmaceutical innovation. Moreover, by explicitly
considering the existence of the price control based price di®erential, we re-
examine the impact of parallel importation upon the consumer surplus of
the home and foreign country. Since the observed crossnational price di®er-
entials are due to various complicated factors, including both governmental
price control based and demand elasticity based factors, it is signi¯cant to
investigate these issues carefully for the sake of more valuable policy debates.
This paper extends the model by Pecorino (2002) in the following two
ways. First, we consider the case where each domestic and foreign market
has di®erent price elasticities of demand, which enables us to analyze the
case where the price di®erentials occur because of both demand elasticity and
negotiation based factors. Second, we explicitly formulate a ¯rm's decisions
about R&D investment, which is not explicitly analyzed in Pecorino (2002).
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Based upon these two extensions, this paper shows that parallel imports
may enhance pharmaceutical innovation when the bargaining power of the
foreign government is strong and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign
market is small. We also show that this increase in R&D induced by parallel
imports may even increase the consumer surplus of the foreign country. The
possibility of the foreign consumer surplus improving because of the parallel
imports has not been considered rigorously in previous literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 establishes the basic
setup. Section 3 examines the case where the domestic government does not
allow parallel imports (NR regime). Section 4 examines the case where the
domestic government allows parallel imports (R regime). Section 5 examines
the impact of parallel imports upon R&D investment by comparing the re-
sults from the NR regime and the R regime. Section 6 examines the impact
of parallel imports upon welfare. Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2 Basic Setup
Following Pecorino (2002), this paper considers a simple partial equilibrium
model of trade that consists of two countries: home (H) and Foreign (F). A
¯rm in the home country produces a good of quality s > 0, which can be
thought of as a pharmaceutical product sold in both the domestic and foreign
markets. We use a model of vertical product di®erentiation to represent
consumer preferences in each market. Consumers di®er in their tastes for the
product quality, but they rank quality in the same way. When a consumer
of type t in the market i = H;F buys a product of quality s at a price pi,
his or her utility is given by ui = ts ¡ pi. If a consumer does not buy, his
or her outside option is normalized to zero. In each market i, a consumer
of type t is uniformly distributed between 0 and T i with unit density. For
clarity of the analysis, we consider the case T F · TH and specify TH and
T F as follows: TH = T and T F = ÁT 0 · Á · 1. These speci¯cations
assume that the maximum willingness to pay in the foreign market is smaller
than or equal to that in the domestic market. After a simple calculation, it
also implies that the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market are
larger than or equal to those in the domestic market. Therefore, as the value
of Á becomes larger and approaches one, the value of the price elasticities
of demand in the foreign market becomes smaller and approaches the value
in the domestic market. Conversely, as the value of Á becomes smaller, the
value of the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market becomes larger
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relative to that in the domestic market.1
A ¯rm conducts R&D and sets the quality of its product according to
a cost function C(s), which satis¯es C 0(s) > 0 and C 00(s) > 0. Then, it
manufactures and delivers its product in both the domestic and foreign mar-
kets. Once a product has been developed, its marginal cost of production is
not a®ected by the level of quality. Thus, we normalize the marginal cost of
production to zero. If the domestic government provides no reimport regime
(NR regime), reimports of the good back into the home country are not al-
lowed. Thus, a ¯rm can set a di®erent price in each market because perfect
market segmentation is possible under the NR regime. However, if the do-
mestic government provides a reimport regime (R regime), reimportation of
the good back into the home country is allowed. Thus, a ¯rm has to set a
uniform price for both the domestic and foreign markets.
Therefore, the order of decision making is summarized as follows. First,
the domestic government declares a parallel import regime. Then, the ¯rm
decides on the quality levels with which it will endow its product. Finally,
the ¯rm manufactures and delivers the product in each market and sets
the prices. In the following subsections, we examine the quality and price
determination process in both the NR and R regimes.
3 NR Regime
We ¯rst consider the price determination process under the assumption that
costs of quality development have already been sunk. Since perfect market
segmentation is possible under the NR regime, a ¯rm can set di®erent prices
in each market. In the domestic market, since the ¯rm has patent protection
on this product, it can act as a monopolist. Since t is uniformly distributed
between 0 and TH , the demand in the home country is XH(pH) = sT¡p
H
s
.
Thus, the pro¯t on domestic sales is given by ¦H(pH) = sT¡p
H
s
pH . By
maximizing this pro¯t with pH , we obtain
pHNR(s) =
sT
2
; (1)
¦HNR(s) =
(sT )2
4s
; (2)
1The price elasticities of demand in the domestic market ²H and in the foreign market
²F are expressed as follows: ²H = psT¡p and ²F =
p
sÁT¡p . Therefore, a lower value of Á
implies a higher value of the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market relative to
the domestic market.
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where pHNR(s) is the price and ¦
H
NR(s) is the pro¯t in the domestic market
under the NR regime. In order to stress that these values depend upon the
level of product quality s, we denote them as a function of s.
The demand and the pro¯t in the foreign market are given by XF (pF ) =
sÁT¡pF
s
and ¦F (pF ) = sÁT¡p
F
s
pF . If the ¯rm were free to set its own price in
the foreign market, it would charge the monopoly price sÁT
2
and obtain the
pro¯t (sÁT )
2
4s
. However, because of governmental control of the drug price,
the foreign drug price is determined by the Nash bargaining game between
the ¯rm and the foreign government. This assumption is relevant in the
pharmaceutical context.
The foreign government would like to maximize consumer surplus in its
country, whereas the monopolist would like to maximize pro¯ts from sales
in the foreign market. The consumer surplus in the foreign country is given
by CSF (pF ) = (sÁT¡p
F )2
2s
. In the absence of agreement, pro¯ts and consumer
surplus are both zero. Thus, zero is the threat point for both the domestic
¯rm and the foreign government. Therefore, the Nash bargained price in the
foreign market under the NR regime pFNR is found by maximizing
[CSF (pF )]®[¦F (pF )]1¡®; (3)
with pF subject to the condition that ¦(pF ) ¸ 0 and CSF (pF ) ¸ 0. Here,
® re°ects the bargaining power of the foreign country. A simple calculation
yields
pFNR(s) =
(1¡ ®)sÁT
2
; (4)
¦FNR(s) =
(1¡ ®2)(sÁT )2
4s
; (5)
where pFNR(s) is the price and ¦
F
NR(s) are the pro¯ts in the foreign market
under the NR regime. The results here depend very obviously on ®. When
® = 1, since the foreign government has the all the bargaining power, we
must have pFNR(s) = 0 and ¦
F
NR(s) = 0, which means that pro¯t for sales
in the foreign market is zero. On the other hand, when ® = 0, since the
domestic ¯rm has the all the bargaining power, we have pFNR(s) =
sÁT
2
and
¦FNR(s) =
(sÁT )2
4s
, which means that the domestic ¯rm charges the monopoly
price and obtains monopoly pro¯t in the foreign market.
Under the NR regime, total pro¯ts of ¯rms from sales in both the domestic
and foreign markets, which are given by ¦TotalNR (s) = ¦
H
NR(s) + ¦
F
NR(s), are
¦TotalNR (s) =
(sT )2
4s
[1 + (1¡ ®2)Á2]: (6)
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Moreover, the consumer surplus of the home country CSHNR(s), which is given
by
(sT¡PHNR(s))2
2s
and the consumer surplus of the foreign country CSFNR(s) ,
which is given by
(sÁT¡PFNR(s))2
2s
, are as follows.
CSHNR(s) =
(sT )2
8s
; (7)
CSFNR(s) =
(sÁT )2
8s
(1 + ®)2: (8)
Finally, the social surplus of the home country SSHNR(s), which is given by
the sum of the total pro¯ts of domestic ¯rm ¦TotalNR (s) and consumer surplus
of home CSHNR(s), is ¦
Total
NR (s) + CS
H
NR(s).
Then, we consider the quality choice of the ¯rm. The ¯rm will choose its
quality level s in order to maximize its net total pro¯t under the NR regime
¦^NR(s):
¦^NR(s) = ¦
Total
NR (s)¡ C(s): (9)
The ¯rst order condition to this problem implies
C 0(s) =
¦TotalNR (s)
s
;
=
T 2
4
[1 + (1¡ ®2)Á2]:
(10)
Let the quality level that solves Equation (10) be denoted as sNR, which ex-
presses the level of the R&D investment conducted by a ¯rm under the NR
regime. Therefore, by substituting this sNR into Equations (1), (4),(6),(7)
and (8), we can obtain the value of prices in both the domestic and for-
eign markets, consumer and social surpluses of the home country, and the
consumer surplus of the foreign country under the NR regime.
4 R Regime
We ¯rst consider the price determination process. Under the R regime, the
negotiated foreign price also becomes the domestic price, owing to the ability
to reimport and the absence of transportation costs. Thus, the law of one
price holds for the good in question: (i.e. pH = pF = p).
The foreign drug price is again determined by the negotiation between
the ¯rm and the foreign government. The foreign government's surplus from
bargaining under the R regime is CSF (p) and the threat point is zero, which
is analogous to the NR regime case. However, the domestic ¯rm's surplus
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(threat point) changes from ¦F (pF ) (0)under the NR regime to ¦H(p) +
¦F (p)¡¦HNR(s) (¦HNR(s) ) under the R regime. ¦H(p)+¦F (p) re°ects pro¯ts
in both the domestic and foreign markets when reimports are allowed, and
¦HNR(s) only re°ects the pro¯ts from sales in the domestic market achieved
by setting the home country monopoly price sT
2
.
These changes in the ¯rm's surplus and the threat points are explained
as follows. Under the NR regime, whether or not agreement is reached,
pro¯ts from home sales are always ¦HNR(s). Therefore, the ¯rm's surplus
from bargaining is independent of the pro¯ts from home sales. However,
under the R regime, the ¯rm's pro¯t from home sales is in°uenced by the
negotiated foreign price. As a result, the term ¦H(p) appears in the ¯rm's
surplus. In the absence of agreement, the ¯rm cannot sell in the foreign
market. However, the ¯rm can at least obtain pro¯ts ¦HNR(s) by setting
monopoly price sT
2
in the home country. Therefore, the threat point of ¯rms
under the R regime becomes ¦HNR(s). This implies that, if the condition
¦H(p) + ¦F (p) ¸ ¦HNR(s) (11)
does not hold, the ¯rm does not sell in the foreign market. Taking this
constraint into account, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 .
If the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market relative to in
the domestic market are su±ciently high to satisfy the condition that
Á <
p
2 ¡ 1, there exists no incentive for ¯rms to sell in the foreign
market under the R regime.
The proof is shown in Appendix A. When the price elasticities of demand
in the foreign market are su±ciently high to satisfy the condition that Á <p
2 ¡ 1, a ¯rm would have to set a su±ciently low uniform price under the
R regime if the drug were sold in both the domestic and foreign markets.
However, the pro¯ts obtained from sales in both the domestic and foreign
markets under such a low uniform price are smaller than the pro¯t obtained
by selling only in the domestic market ¦HNR(s) at the home monopoly price.
Thus, with the R regime, when Á <
p
2¡ 1, the ¯rm sets its price as follows.
pR1(s) =
sT
2
; (12)
where pR1(s) denotes the price under the R regime when Á <
p
2¡1. In addi-
tion, the total pro¯ts under the R regime, which are given by [sT¡pR1(s)
s
]pR1(s),
are
¦TotalR1 (s) =
(sT )2
4s
; (13)
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where ¦TotalR1 (s) denotes the pro¯t under the R regime when Á <
p
2 ¡ 1.
Since pR1(s) = p
H
NR(s) holds by de¯nition, the condition ¦
Total
R1 (s) = ¦
H
NR(s)
also holds.
Suppose the condition Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1 holds, the domestic ¯rm reaches an
agreement with the foreign government and starts to sell in the foreign mar-
ket. Thus, when Á ¸ p2¡ 1, the Nash bargained uniform price under the R
regime is found by maximizing
[CSF (p)]®[¦H(p) + ¦F (p)¡ ¦HNR(s)]1¡®; (14)
with p subject to the condition that CSF (p) ¸ 0 and Equation (11). Here,
Equation (11) is rewritten as
~p · p · ¹p: (15)
where
~p ´ sT
4
[1 + Á¡
p
(1 + Á)2 ¡ 2];
and
¹p ´ sT
4
[1 + Á+
p
(1 + Á)2 ¡ 2]:
Taking this constraint into accounts, we obtain
pR2(s) =
sT
8
[(1 + ®)(1 + Á) + 4(1¡ ®)Á¡
p
X]; (16)
where
X ´ (1 + ®)2(1 + Á)2 ¡ 8[®+ (1¡ ®)2Á(1¡ Á)]
and pR2(s) denotes the price under the R regime, when Á ¸
p
2 ¡ 1. In
addition, when Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1, the total pro¯ts ¦totalR (s) under the R regime,
which is given by [ sT¡pR2(s)
s
]pR2(s) + [
sÁT¡pR2(s)
s
]pR2(s), are
¦TotalR2 (s) =
(sT )2
4s
Y; (17)
where
Y ´ [ (1¡ ®
2)(1 + Á)2
4
+ 2(1¡ ®)2Á(1¡ Á) + ®+ (1¡ ®)(3Á¡ 1)
4
p
X]
and ¦TotalR2 (s) denotes the pro¯ts under the R regime when Á ¸
p
2 ¡ 1.
Appendix B explains the deduction of Equation (16) more rigorously. The
results here again depend very obviously on ®. When ® = 1, since the foreign
government has the all the bargaining power, we must have PR2(s) = ~p, which
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is the lowest price satisfying the participation constraints of the domestic
¯rm. On the other hand, when ® = 0, since the domestic ¯rm has the all
the bargaining power, we have PR2(s) =
sT
4
(1 + Á), which is the monopoly
price that maximizes ¦H(p)+¦F (p) given the restriction on uniform pricing
under the R regime.
The changes in the domestic ¯rm's surplus and the threat points discussed
above suggest that price concessions by the ¯rm under the R regime are
much more costly than those under the NR regime, because they a®ect the
domestic market as well as the foreign market. As a result, we should expect
the domestic ¯rm to drive a harder bargain under the R regime than under
the NR regime. We denote this as the \strengthened negotiation e®ect" due
to the parallel imports. This \strengthened negotiation e®ect" leads to higher
total pro¯ts under the R regime than under the NR regime. Therefore, the
condition ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s is more likely to hold. However, under
the R regime, the law of one price holds because of the ability to reimport. We
denote this as the \uniform pricing e®ect" due to the parallel imports. This
\uniform pricing e®ect" leads to lower pro¯ts under the R regime than under
the NR regime. Therefore, the condition that ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s
is less likely to hold. Thus, the overall e®ect on ¯rm pro¯tability appears to
be ambiguous.
Therefore, under the R regime, the price PR(s) and the total pro¯ts of
¯rm ¦TotalR (s) are expressed as follows.
PR(s)
½
= PR1(s) if Á <
p
2¡ 1;
= PR2(s) if Á ¸
p
2¡ 1; (18)
¦TotalR (s)
½
= ¦TotalR1 (s) if Á <
p
2¡ 1;
= ¦TotalR2 (s) if Á ¸
p
2¡ 1: (19)
Moreover, the consumer surplus of the home country CSHR (s), which is
given by (sT¡PR(s))
2
2s
, is
CSHR (s)
½
= CSHR1(s) if Á <
p
2¡ 1;
= CSHR2(s) if Á ¸
p
2¡ 1; (20)
where
CSHR1(s) ´
(sT )2
8s
;
CSHR2(s) ´
(sT )2
128s
[7¡ 5Á+ ®(3Á¡ 1) +
p
X]2:
10
Here, CSHR1(s) ´ (sT¡PR1(s))
2
2s
and CSHR2(s) ´ (sT¡PR2(s))
2
2s
. In addition, the
consumer surplus of the foreign country CSFR(s), which is given by
(sÁT¡PR(s))2
2s
,
is
CSFR(s)
½
= 0 if Á <
p
2¡ 1
= CSFR2(s) if Á ¸
p
2¡ 1 (21)
where
CSFR2(s) ´
(sT )2
128s
[(1 + ®)(3Á¡ 1) +
p
X]2:
Here, CSFR2(s) ´ (sÁT¡PR2(s))
2
2s
and the consumer surplus in the foreign market
becomes zero, since the ¯rm does not sell in the foreign market when Á <p
2¡1. Finally, the social surplus of the home country SSHR (s), which is given
by the sum of the total pro¯ts of domestic ¯rm ¦TotalR (s) and the consumer
surplus of the home country CSHR (s), are ¦
Total
R (s) + CS
H
R (s).
Then, we consider the quality choice of the ¯rm. The ¯rm will choose its
quality level s in order to maximize its net total pro¯t under the R regime
¦^R(s):
¦^R(s) = ¦
Total
R (s)¡ C(s): (22)
The ¯rst order conditions to this problem imply
C 0(s) =
¦TotalR (s)
s
;½
= T
2
4
if Á <
p
2¡ 1;
= T
2
4
Y if Á ¸ p2¡ 1:
(23)
Let the quality level that solves Equation (23) be denoted as sR1 (sR2), which
expresses the level of the R&D investment conducted by a ¯rm under the R
regime, when Á <
p
2¡1 (Á ¸ p2¡1). Therefore, by substituting these sR1
and sR2 into Equations (12), (13),(16),(17),(20) and (21), we can obtain the
values of the price, consumer surplus and social surplus of the home country,
as well as the consumer surplus of the foreign country under the R regime.
5 The Impacts of Parallel Imports upon R&D
investment and the Net Total Pro¯t
This section examines how parallel importation in°uences R&D investment
and the net pro¯t of the ¯rm. By comparing the results in Equation (10)
and (23), we obtain the following proposition
Proposition 1 .
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1. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market are suf-
¯ciently high to satisfy the condition that Á <
p
2 ¡ 1, the relation
¦TotalR (s) · ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s holds. Thus, the R&D investment under
the NR regime is higher than or equal to that under the R regime.
2. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market are su±-
ciently low to satisfy the condition that Á ¸ p2¡ 1,
(a) the R&D investment under the NR regime is higher than or equal
to that under the R regime, if the relation ¦TotalR (s) · ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s
holds.
(b) the R&D investment under the R regime is higher than or equal to
that under the NR regime, if the relation ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s
holds.
The proof is shown in Appendix C. Proposition 1-1 indicates that parallel
importation leads to lower R&D investment, if the price elasticities of demand
in the foreign market are su±ciently high to satisfy the condition that Á <p
2 ¡ 1. When Á < p2 ¡ 1, under the R regime, the ¯rm has no incentive
to sell in the foreign market as shown in Lemma 1. Thus, the ¯rm sells
only in the domestic market at the home monopoly price and obtains pro¯ts
¦TotalR1 (s) = ¦
H
NR(s). However, under the NR regime, the ¯rm has an incentive
to sell in both the domestic and foreign markets irrespective of the value
of Á, since the ¯rm can set di®erent prices in di®erent markets according
to their price elasticities of demand. Thus, the ¯rm sets the price PHNR(s)
in the home country and P FNR(s) in the foreign country, respectively, and
obtains pro¯ts ¦TotalNR (s) = ¦
H
NR(s) + ¦
F
NR(s). These results suggest that
parallel importation makes it impossible for the ¯rm to obtain pro¯ts from
the foreign market, when Á <
p
2 ¡ 1 (\the loss of foreign market e®ect").
Thus, parallel importation leads to lower R&D investment when Á <
p
2¡ 1
because of \the loss of foreign market e®ect".
However, Proposition 1-2 indicates that parallel importation may lead
to higher R&D investment if the price elasticities of demand in the foreign
market are su±ciently low to satisfy the condition that Á ¸ p2¡ 1 and the
condition ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s holds. As mentioned in the Section
4, since the negotiated foreign price a®ects not only the pro¯ts from the
foreign market, but also the pro¯ts from the domestic market, the ¯rm has
an incentive to drive a harder bargain under the R regime than under the NR
regime. This \strengthened negotiation e®ect" leads to higher total pro¯ts
under the R regime than under the NR regime. Therefore, the condition
¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s is more likely to hold. However, under the R
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regime, the law of one price holds because of the ability to reimport. This
\uniform pricing e®ect" leads to lower pro¯ts under the R regime than under
the NR regime. Therefore, the condition that ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s
is less likely to hold. These results suggest that parallel importation leads
to higher R&D investment when Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1, supposing the \strengthened
negotiation e®ect" dominates the \uniform pricing e®ect".
To investigate more extensively under what economic environments for
parallel importation leads to higher or lower R&D investment, we compare
the results under the NR and R regimes for some values of ® and Á. Firstly,
we examine the case when ® = 0 and 1 and obtain the following results.
Result 1 .
1. When all the bargaining power resides with the domestic ¯rm (® = 0),
the R&D investment under the NR regime is higher than or equal to
that under the R regime.
2. When all the bargaining power resides with the foreign government (® =
1), the R&D investment is the same under either regime.
The proof is shown in the Appendix D. Result 1-1 indicates that parallel
importation leads to lower R&D investment when ® = 0. When ® = 0, since
all the bargaining power lies with the domestic ¯rm, price controls by the
foreign government become meaningless. Thus, the ¯rm can freely set the
price in the foreign market under either the NR or R regime. Under the NR
regime, the ¯rm can set di®erent prices in di®erent markets. However, under
the R regime, the ¯rm has to set a uniform price in both markets. Thus,
total pro¯ts under the R regime are lower than those under the NR regime.2
This result implies that parallel importation leads to lower ¯rm pro¯ts and,
thus, lower R&D investment. Note that, when ® = 0, all the bargaining
power lies with domestic ¯rms irrespective of the parallel import regimes.
Thus, the impact of the ¯rm's strengthened bargaining power induced by
parallel importation becomes negligible. Therefore, the \uniform pricing
e®ect" dominates the \strengthened negotiation e®ect".
Result 1-2 indicates that parallel importation has no impact upon R&D
investment when ® = 1. When ® = 1, since all the bargaining power lies
with the foreign government, the foreign government can freely set the price
in the foreign market under either the NR or R regimes. Under the NR
regime, the foreign government maximizes the consumer surplus by setting
2The situation examined here when ® = 0 is the same as the situation examined in the
well-known models of third degree price discrimination such as those of Varian (1985) and
Malueg and Schwartz (1994).
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the foreign price as zero. Thus, the domestic ¯rm obtains zero pro¯ts from
sales in the foreign market. This means that the total pro¯ts under the
NR regime equal the domestic monopoly pro¯ts (i.e. ¦TotalNR (s) = ¦
H
NR(s)).
However, under the R regime, the foreign government has to set the price that
satis¯es the participation constraint of the domestic ¯rm de¯ned in Equation
(11). Thus, the ¯rm sets the foreign price as ~p, which is also becomes the
domestic price. From Equation (11), when p = ~p, total pro¯ts under the
R regime equal the domestic monopoly pro¯ts (i.e. ¦TotalR (s) = ¦
H
NR(s)).
These results imply that parallel importation has no in°uence upon the ¯rm's
pro¯ts and thus none on the R&D incentives. Note that, when ® = 1, all the
bargaining power lies with the foreign government irrespective of the parallel
import regimes. Thus, the impact of the ¯rm's strengthened bargaining
power induced by parallel importation becomes signi¯cant. Result 1-2 implies
that the \strengthened negotiation e®ect" is large enough to cancel out the
\uniform pricing e®ect".
Secondly, we examine the case when Á = 1
2
and 1, respectively, and obtain
the following results.
Result 2 .
1. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy the
condition that Á = 1
2
, the R&D investment under the NR regime is
higher than or equal to that under the R regime.
2. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy the
condition that Á = 1, R&D investment under the R regime is higher
than or equal to that under the NR regime.
The proof is shown in the Appendix E. Results 2-1 and 2-2 indicate that
parallel importation leads to lower R&D investment when Á = 1
2
, whereas
it leads to higher R&D investment when Á = 1. The higher value of Á
implies a lower value of the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market.
Therefore, the negative impacts of the \uniform pricing e®ect" weaken as the
value of Á becomes higher.
When Á = 1
2
, the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market are
high enough. Thus, the \uniform pricing e®ect" dominates the \strengthened
negotiation e®ect". When Á = 1, the price elasticities of demand in the
foreign market are low enough and equal to those in the domestic market.
Thus, the \strengthened negotiation e®ect" dominates the \uniform pricing
e®ect".3
3The situation examined here when Á = 1 is the same as the situation examined in
Pecorino(2002).
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Finally, we consider the case when Á = 3
4
and 7
8
, respectively, and obtain
the following results.
Result 3 .
1. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy the
condition that Á = 3
4
, the R&D investment under the R regime is higher
(lower) than or equal to that under the NR regime, if ® ¸ ®^Á= 3
4
(® ·
®^Á= 3
4
). The ®^Á= 3
4
is de¯ned as ®, which satis¯es the condition that
fÁ= 3
4
(®) = 0, where fÁ= 3
4
(®) ´ 5p25 + 18®+ 25®2 ¡ (11®+ 27).
2. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy the
condition that Á = 7
8
, the R&D investment under the R regime is higher
(lower) than or equal to that under the NR regime, if ® ¸ ®^Á= 7
8
(® ·
®^Á= 7
8
). The ®^Á= 7
8
is de¯ned as ®, which satis¯es the condition that
fÁ= 7
8
(®) = 0, where fÁ= 7
8
(®) ´ 13p169 + 50®+ 169®2 ¡ (27®+ 171).
3. The value of ®^Á= 7
8
is smaller than the value of ®^Á= 3
4
.
The proof is shown in Appendix F . Results 3-1 and 3-2 indicate that, given
a su±ciently high value of Á, parallel importation leads to the higher (lower)
R&D investment, when the value of ® is higher (lower) than a certain thresh-
old value. Moreover, Result 3-3 provides us an insight that the range of ®
where the parallel import leads to higher R&D investment becomes wider
as the value of Á becomes larger. Therefore, Result 3 suggests that parallel
importation is likely to induce higher R&D investment, as the values of both
® and Á become larger.
The intuition behind these results is analogous to those in Results 1 and
2. The participation constraints of the ¯rm de¯ned in Equation (11) is the
key driving force that causes the ¯rm to bargain harder under the R regime
than under the NR regime. The in°uence of these participation constraints
become more prominent when the value of ® is high and the bargaining power
of the foreign government is strong. Consequently, given a su±ciently high
value of Á, the \strengthened negotiation e®ect" is likely to dominate the
\uniform pricing e®ect", as the value of ® becomes larger. In addition, as
discussed in Result 2, a higher value of Á leads to a smaller impact of the
\uniform pricing e®ect". Therefore, a higher value of Á lowers the threshold
value of ® and widens the range of ® where the \strengthened negotiation
e®ect" dominates the \uniform pricing e®ect".
In order to con¯rm the results discussed above and obtain more insight,
we provide a numerical example. For illustrative purposes, we specify the
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functional form of the cost function of R&D C(s) as
C(s) =
1
¯
s¯ ¯ > 1; (24)
where ¯ is the parameter that determines the curvature of the marginal cost
function. A higher value of ¯ implies a higher slope of the marginal cost
function. Following Valletti (2005), we set the baseline parameterization of
the model as follows: T = 10, k = 30 and ¯ = 3. Then, given these values,
we increase the values of Á and ® from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.1.
Table 1 shows the di®erence in the R&D investment SR ¡ SNR between
the two regimes for various sets of the values of Á and ®. For later analysis,
we denote the parameter region of (Á, ®) that satis¯es Á · 0:4 < p2¡ 1 as
the Case 1 region. The Case 1 region is shown as the shaded area in the light
gray in Table 1. As shown in Proposition 1, when Á · 0:4 < p2¡ 1, parallel
importation leads to lower R&D investment. In this region, since the price
elasticities of demand in the foreign market are too high for the ¯rm to sell
in the foreign market under the R regime, parallel importation reduces the
¯rm's pro¯ts and incentives to invest in R&D.
When Á ¸ 0:5 > p2 ¡ 1, there exist two di®erent regions. One is the
region where parallel importation leads to lower R&D investment. The other
is the region where parallel importation leads to higher R&D investment.
We denote the former region as the Case 2 region and the latter region as
the Case 3 region. The Case 2 (Case 3) region is shown as the area shaded
dark gray (as the area without shading) in Table 1. Then, we can easily
con¯rm that the Case 3 region lies in the area where the values of Á and ®
are larger than those in the Case 2. As discussed in Results 1, 2 and 3, when
the both values Á and ® are smaller (Case 2), the \uniform pricing e®ect"
is likely to dominate the \strengthened negotiation e®ect". Thus, parallel
importation leads to lower R&D investment. However, when the values of
both Á and ® are larger (Case 3), the \strengthened negotiation e®ect" is
likely to dominate the \uniform pricing e®ect". Thus, parallel importation
leads to higher R&D investment.
Before concluding this section, we con¯rm the impact of parallel impor-
tation upon the net total pro¯t of the domestic ¯rm by explicitly considering
the di®erences in the level as well as the cost of R&D investment between
the R and the NR regimes. From Proposition 1 and the de¯nitions of the
Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 regions, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 .
Suppose the di®erences in the level as well as the cost of the R&D
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investment between the R and the NR regimes are explicitly taken into
account.
1. In the Case 1 and Case 2 regions, the net total pro¯t of the domestic
¯rm under the NR regime ¦^NR(sNR) is larger than or equal to in that
under the R regime ¦^R(sR).
2. In the Case 3 region, the net total pro¯t of the domestic ¯rm under the
R regime ¦^R(sR) is larger than or equal to that under the NR regime
¦^NR(sNR).
The proof is shown in Appendix G. Proposition 2-1 indicates that parallel
importation deteriorates the net total pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm in both the
Case 1 and Case 2 regions, and Proposition 2-2 indicates that it improves
the net total pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm in the Case 3 region. Since the \loss
of foreign market e®ect" exists in the Case 1 region, or the \uniform pricing
e®ect" dominates the \ strengthened negotiation e®ect" in the Case 2 region,
parallel importation leads to lower pro¯ts for the ¯rm. However, in the Case 3
region, the \strengthened negotiation e®ect" dominates the \uniform pricing
e®ect". Thus, parallel importation leads to the larger pro¯ts of the ¯rm.
Proposition 2-1 and 2-2 con¯rm that this intuition holds even if we explicitly
consider the di®erences in the level as well as the cost of R&D investment
between the R and the NR regimes.
6 Welfare Analysis
This section examines how parallel importation in°uences the consumer sur-
plus of the home and the foreign countries. Parallel importation in°uences
the consumer surplus in the following two di®erent ways. First, it in°uences
the consumer surplus through its impact upon the pricing regime (i.e. the
uniform pricing regime or the di®erential pricing regime). We denote this
as the \pricing regime e®ect". Second, it in°uences the consumer surplus
through its impact upon the level of R&D investment. We denote it as the
\R&D investment e®ect". For the clarity of the analysis, we ¯rst ignore the
\R&D investment e®ect" and only examine how the \pricing regime e®ect"
in°uences the consumer surplus of the home and the foreign country. By
using the results in Equations (7), (8),(20) and (21), we obtain the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2 .
17
Suppose there is no change in R&D investment under either the R
regime and NR regime
1. Then, when Á <
p
2 ¡ 1 (in the Case 1 region), the consumer surplus
of the home country is the same under either the NR-regime or the
R-regime, while the consumer surplus of the foreign country under the
R regime is lower than or equal to that under the NR regime.
2. Then, when Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1 (in the Case 2 and Case 3 regions), the
consumer surplus of the home country with the R regime is higher than
or equal to that with the NR regime, whereas the consumer surplus of
the foreign country with the R regime is lower than or equal to that with
the NR regime.
The proof is shown in Appendix H. Lemma 2-1 indicates that parallel impor-
tation has no in°uence upon the consumer surplus of the home country in
the Case 1 region, whereas it deteriorates the consumer surplus of the foreign
country, if we ignore the \R&D investment e®ect". When Á <
p
2 ¡ 1, as
shown in Equations (1) and (12), parallel importation has no impact upon
the pricing method in the domestic market. Thus, the consumer surplus of
the home country also does not change. However, parallel importation in-
duces the ¯rm not to sell in the foreign market in the Case 1 region (\the
loss of market e®ect"). Thus, it makes the consumer surplus of the foreign
country become zero.
Lemma 2-2 indicates that parallel importation leads to higher (lower)
consumer surplus of the home (foreign) country in the Case 2 and Case 3 re-
gions, if we ignore the \R&D investment e®ect". This result is consistent with
the results obtained in the previous literature such as Malueg and Schwartz
(1994) and Varian (1985). If we ignore the \R&D investment e®ect", parallel
importation leads to lower (higher) prices in the domestic (foreign) market.
Thus, it leads to a higher (lower) consumer surplus in the home (foreign)
country.
Then, by explicitly considering both the \pricing regime e®ect" and the
\R&D investment e®ect", we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 .
Suppose the di®erences in the R&D investment between the R regime
and the NR regime are explicitly taken into account.
1. Then, in the Case 1 region, the consumer surplus of the home (foreign)
country under the R regime is lower than or equal to that under the NR
regime.
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2. Then, in the Case 2 region, the consumer surplus of the foreign country
with the R regime is lower than or equal to that with the NR regime,
while it is ambiguous whether the consumer surplus of the home country
with the R regime is higher or lower than with the NR regime.
3. Then, in the Case 3 region, the consumer surplus of the home country
with the R regime is higher than or equal to that with the NR regime,
while it is ambiguous whether the consumer surplus of the foreign coun-
try in the R regime is higher or lower than under the NR regime.
The proof is shown in Appendix I. Proposition 3-1 indicates that parallel
importation deteriorates the consumer surplus of the home and the foreign
country in the Case 1 region, if we consider the \R&D investment e®ect"
explicitly. The Case 1 region is de¯ned as the parameter region of (Á, ®),
which satis¯es Á <
p
2¡ 1. In the Case 1 region, as discussed in Lemma 2-1,
the \pricing regime e®ect" has no in°uence upon the consumer surplus of
the home country. However, as shown in Table 1, parallel importation lowers
R&D investment because of the \loss of foreign market e®ect". This lowers
R&D investment and induces reduced quality of the product. Thus, parallel
importation deteriorates the consumer surplus of the home country through
its negative impacts upon R&D investment. In addition, as discussed in
Lemma 2-1, parallel importation induces the ¯rm to not sell in the foreign
market. Thus, it makes the consumer surplus of the foreign country become
zero.
Proposition 3-2 indicates that parallel importation deteriorates the con-
sumer surplus of the foreign country in the Case 2 region, whereas its impact
upon the consumer surplus of the home country is ambiguous, if we consider
the \R&D investment e®ect" explicitly. The Case 2 region is de¯ned as the
parameter region of (Á, ®) where parallel importation lowers the R&D in-
vestment when Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1, since the \uniform pricing e®ect" dominates
the \strengthened negotiation e®ect". Lower R&D investment means lower
quality of the product. Moreover, Lemma 2-2 shows that the \pricing regime
e®ect" deteriorates the consumer surplus of the foreign country. Thus, par-
allel importation unambiguously deteriorates the consumer surplus of the
foreign country. The lower R&D investment induced by parallel importation
also has a negative impact upon the consumer surplus of the home coun-
try. However, as shown in Lemma 2-2, the \pricing regime e®ect" provides
positive impacts upon the consumer surplus of the home country. Thus,
it is ambiguous whether parallel importation improves or deteriorates the
consumer surplus of the home country.
Proposition 3-3 indicates that parallel importation improves the consumer
surplus of the home country in the Case 3 region, whereas its impact upon
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the consumer surplus of the foreign country is ambiguous, if we consider
the \R&D investment e®ect" explicitly. The Case 3 region is de¯ned as
the parameter region of (Á, ®) where parallel importation leads to higher
R&D investment when Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1, since the \strengthened negotiation
e®ect" dominates the \uniform pricing e®ect". The higher R&D investment
means higher product quality. Moreover, Lemma 2-2 shows that the \pricing
regime e®ect" improves the consumer surplus of the home country. Therefore,
parallel imports unambiguously improve the consumer surplus of the foreign
country. The higher R&D investment induced by the parallel import also has
a positive impact upon the consumer surplus of the foreign country. However,
as shown in Lemma 2-2, the \pricing regime e®ect" has a negative impact
upon the consumer surplus of the foreign country. Thus, it is ambiguous
whether parallel imports improve or deteriorate the consumer surplus of the
foreign country.
By explicitly considering the \R&D investment e®ect", we can observe
the following two interesting results. Propositions 2-1 and 2-2 suggest that
parallel importation may deteriorate not only the consumer surplus of the
foreign country, but also the consumer surplus of the home country in the
Case 1 and Case 2 regions because of its negative impact upon the R&D
investment. Thus, in the Case 1 and Case 2 regions, as the negative impact
of the parallel import upon the R&D investment increases, parallel importa-
tion is more likely to deteriorate the consumer surplus of the home country.
This possibility of home consumer surplus deterioration due to parallel im-
portation is not examined rigorously in previous literature. Moreover, by
explicitly considering the existence of the \price control based price di®er-
entials", we can observe the Case 3 region where parallel importation leads
to higher R&D investment. In the Case 3 region, as shown in Proposition
2-3, parallel importation may improve not only the consumer surplus of the
home country, but also the consumer surplus of the foreign country because
of its positive impact upon R&D investment. Thus, in the Case 3 region, as
the positive impact of parallel importation upon R&D investment increases,
parallel importation is more likely to improve the consumer surplus of the for-
eign country. This possibility of foreign consumer surplus improvement due
to the parallel import is also not examined rigorously in previous literature.
These considerations suggest that parallel importation is likely to dete-
riorate (improve) the consumer surplus of the home country in the Case 2
region if its negative impact upon R&D investment increases (decreases). In
addition, parallel importation is likely to improve (deteriorate) the consumer
surplus of the foreign country in the Case 3 region, if its positive impact upon
the R&D investment increases (decreases).
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To con¯rm the result discussed above and obtain more insight, we again
give a numerical example. Table 2-1 (Table 3-1) shows the di®erence in the
consumer surplus of the home country CSHR ¡CSHNR between the two regimes
for various sets of the values of Á and ® and Table 2-2 (Table 3-2) also shows
the di®erence in the consumer surplus of the foreign country CSFR ¡ CSFNR.
Again, the Case 1 region is shown as the light gray shaded area, the Case
2 region is shown as the dark gray shaded area, and the Case 3 region is
expressed as the area without shading.
A lower value of ¯ means a lower slope of the marginal cost function
of the R&D investment. Simple calculation using Equations (10), (23) and
(24) shows that a lower value of ¯ induces larger di®erences in investments
(jsR ¡ sNRj) between the two regimes. Thus, as the value of ¯ decreases,
the \R&D investment e®ect" increases in all regions. Therefore, the negative
(positive) impact of parallel imports upon the R&D investment becomes
larger in the Case 2 region (the Case 3 region).
Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show the case where ¯ is large (¯ = 3:1) and thus
the \R&D investment e®ect" is small. As is consistent with the results
in Proposition 2, we can con¯rm that parallel importation deteriorates the
consumer surplus of both the home and foreign countries in the Case 1 region,
deteriorates the consumer surplus of the foreign country in the Case 2 region,
and improves the consumer surplus of the home country in the Case 3 region.
Moreover, since ¯ is large (¯ = 3:1) and the \R&D investment e®ect" is small,
the \pricing regime e®ect" dominates the \ R&D investment e®ect". Thus,
we can con¯rm that parallel importation improves the consumer surplus of
the home country in the Case 2 region, and deteriorates the consumer surplus
of the foreign country.
On the other hand, Table 3 shows the case in which ¯ is small (¯ =
1:1) and thus the \R&D investment e®ect" is large. In this case, the \
R&D investment e®ect" can dominate the \pricing regime e®ect". Thus,
we can ¯nd some regions where parallel importation deteriorates (improves)
the consumer surplus of the home (foreign) country in the Case 2 region
(the Case 3 region). Thus, when ¯ is small (¯ = 1:1) and thus the \R&D
investment e®ect" is large, in the Case 2 and 3 region, we can observe the
somewhat counterintuitive impact of parallel trade.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined how parallel importation in°uences pharmaceutical in-
novation and the welfare of an economy, when the crossnational drug price
di®erentials occur not only because of demand elasticity based factors, but
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also because of factors based on governmental drug price control. This paper
extended the model by Pecorino (2002) in the following two ways. First, we
considered the case in which each domestic and foreign market had di®erent
price elasticities of demand. Second, we explicitly formulated the ¯rm's de-
cisions about R&D investment. Based upon these two extensions, this paper
showed that parallel importation might enhance pharmaceutical innovation
when the bargaining power of the foreign government is strong and the price
elasticity of demand in the foreign market is small. We also showed that this
increase in R&D induced by parallel importation might even increase the
consumer surplus of the foreign country. This possibility of foreign consumer
surplus improvement due to parallel importation has not been considered
rigorously in previous literature.
Recent policy debates on parallel importation of drugs have implicitly as-
sumed that the crossnational drug price di®erentials occur because of demand
elasticity based factors. However, in the drug price context, the governmental
drug price control also plays a signi¯cant role. This paper showed that the
qualitative impact of parallel importation upon pharmaceutical innovation
and the welfare of the economy might di®er substantially if factors based
on governmental drug price control are considered explicitly. Therefore, for
more valuable policy debates on the issue of the parallel import of drugs, we
need to take much more care in considering the causes of crossnational drug
price di®erentials.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Since ¦H(p) +¦F (p) = [ (1+Á)sT¡2p
s
]p, it is the quadratic function of p. Thus,
¦H(p) + ¦F (p) achieves its maximum value of (1+Á)
2(sT )2
8s
at p = (1+Á)sT
4
.
Therefore, the relation ¦H(p)+¦F (p) ¸ ¦HNR(s) does not hold, if (1+Á)
2(sT )2
8s
<
¦HNR(s) =
(sT )2
4s
. Simple calculation shows that this condition can be rewrit-
ten as (1 + Á)2 · 2 or Á < p2¡ 1.
Appendix B: Deduction of Equation (16)
Let us de¯ne V (p) ´ [CSF (p)]®[¦H(p)+¦F (p)¡¦HNR(s)]1¡®: By maximizing
Equation (14) with p subject to CSF (p) ¸ 0 and Equation (15), we obtain
the following ¯rst and second order conditions, respectively:
¡(p) ´ ®CS
F 0(p)
CSF (p)
+ (1¡ ®) ¦
Total(p)
¦Total0(p)¡ ¦HNR(s)
= 0 (25)
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¡0(p) = ¡® 2
(sÁT ¡ p)2+(1¡®)
¦Total
00
(p)(¦Total ¡ ¦HNR(s))¡ (¦Total0(p))2
(¦Total(p)¡ ¦HNR(s))2
< 0
(26)
where the right hand side of Equation (25) is de¯ned as ¡(p).
After tedious calculation, Equation (25) is written as
4p2 ¡ [(1 + ®)(1 + Á) + 4(1¡ ®)Á]sTp+ [(1¡ ®)(1 + Á)Á+ ®
2
](sT )2 = 0:
Thus, we obtain the following two candidates for the optimal interior solution.
p1; p2 =
sT
8
[(1 + ®)(1 + Á) + 4(1¡ ®)Á§
p
X]:
Since 0 · Á · 1 and (1 + Á)2 ¸ 2 because of Á ¸ p2¡ 1, we can show that
X = (1 + ®)2(1 + Á)2 ¡ 8[®+ (1¡ ®)2Á(1¡ Á)]
¸ 2(1 + ®)2 ¡ 8[®+ (1¡ ®)2Á(1¡ Á)]
= 2(1¡ ®)2[1¡ 4Á(1¡ Á)] ¸ 0:
Since CSF (p) is a decreasing function of p and p2 · p1, we obtain CSF (p2) ¸
CSF (p1). Moreover, by substituting p1 and p2 into ¦
H(p)+¦F (p)¡¦HNR(s),
we can show that ¦H(p2) + ¦
F (p2)¡¦HNR(s) ¸ ¦H(p1) + ¦F (p1)¡¦HNR(s).
Hence we can con¯rm that the condition V (p2) ¸ V (p1) holds. Therefore, p2
becomes the optimal interior solution.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1
From Equations (10) and (23), we can ¯nd that the condition SNR ¸ (·)SR
holds, if and only if ¦TotalNR (s) ¸ (·)¦TotalR (s) for 8 s. When Á <
p
2¡1, from
Equations (6) and (13), ¦TotalNR (s)¡¦TotalR (s) = (sT )
2
4s
(1¡®)Á2 ¸ 0. Therefore,
when the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market are su±ciently
high to satisfy the condition that Á <
p
2 ¡ 1, the R&D investment under
the NR regime is higher than or equal to that under the R regime.
Appendix D: Proof of Result 1
1) From Equations (10) and (23), we can ¯nd that the condition SNR ¸ (·
)SR holds, if and only if ¦
Total
NR (s) ¸ (·)¦TotalR (s) for 8 s. When Á <
p
2¡1,
from Proposition 1 the condition SNR ¸ SR holds. When Á ¸
p
2 ¡ 1, by
introducing ®=0 into Equation (6) and (17), we obtain ¦TotalNR (s)¡¦TotalR2 (s) =
(sT )2
8s
(1¡ Á)2 ¸ 0. Therefore, when all the bargaining power resides with the
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domestic ¯rm (® = 0), the R&D investment under the NR regime is higher
than or equal to that under the R regime.
2) When Á <
p
2 ¡ 1, by introducing ®=1 into Equation (6), we obtain
¦TotalNR (s) = ¦
Total
R1 (s) =
(sT )2
4s
. When Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1, by introducing ®=1 into
Equation (6) and (17), we obtain ¦TotalNR (s) = ¦
Total
R2 (s) =
(sT )2
4s
. Therefore,
when all the bargaining power resides with the foreign government (® = 1),
the R&D investment is the same under either the NR regime or the R regime.
Appendix E: Proof of Result 2
1) From Equations (10) and (23), we can ¯nd that the condition SNR ¸
(·)SR holds, if and only if ¦TotalNR (s) ¸ (·)¦TotalR (s) for 8 s. Note that
Á = 1
2
>
p
2 ¡ 1. By introducing Á = 1
2
into Equations (6) and (17), we
obtain ¦TotalNR (s) ¡ ¦TotalR2 (s) = (sT )
2
32s
(1 ¡ ®)2 ¸ 0. Therefore, when the price
elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy the condition that Á = 1
2
,
the R&D investment under the NR regime is higher than or equal to that
under the R regime.
2) Note that Á = 1 >
p
2 ¡ 1. By introducing Á = 1 into Equations (6)
and (17), we obtain ¦TotalNR (s)¡¦TotalR2 (s) = ¡ (sT )
2
4s
(1¡ ®)(p1 + ®2 ¡ 1) · 0.
Therefore, when the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy
the condition that Á = 1, the R&D investment under the R regime is higher
than or equal to that under the NR regime.
Appendix F: Proof of Result 3
1) By introducing Á = 3
4
into Equations (6) and (17), we obtain
¦TotalR2 (s)¡ ¦TotalNR (s) =
(sT )2
256s
(1¡ ®)fÁ= 3
4
(®);
where
fÁ= 3
4
(®) ´ ªÁ= 3
4
(®)¡£Á= 3
4
(®);
and
ªÁ= 3
4
(®) ´ 5
p
25 + 18®+ 25®2;
£Á= 3
4
(®) ´ 11®+ 27:
In addition, we can show that fÁ= 3
4
(0) = ¡2 < 0, fÁ= 3
4
(1) = 2 > 0,
ª0
Á= 3
4
(®) =
5(25®+ 9)p
25 + 18®+ 25®2
> 0;
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and
ª00
Á= 3
4
(®) =
2720
(25 + 18®+ 25®2)
3
2
> 0:
If ®=1, we can ¯nd that ¦TotalR2 (s) = ¦
Total
NR (s). If 0 · ® < 1, the value of
¦TotalR2 (s) ¡ ¦TotalNR (s) has the same sign as the value of fÁ= 3
4
(®). Because of
the properties of fÁ= 3
4
(®), ªÁ= 3
4
(®) and £Á= 3
4
(®) summarized above, we can
show that there exists a unique ®^Á= 3
4
2 (0; 1) that satis¯es the condition that
fÁ= 3
4
(®) · 0 if ® · ®^Á= 3
4
, and fÁ= 3
4
(®) ¸ 0 if ® ¸ ®^Á= 3
4
and fÁ= 3
4
(®^Á= 3
4
) = 0.
Therefore, the R&D investment under the R (NR) regime is higher than or
equal to that under the NR (R) regime, if ® ¸ (·)®^Á= 3
4
.
2)By introducing Á = 7
8
into Equations (6) and (17), we obtain
¦TotalR2 (s)¡ ¦TotalNR (s) =
(sT )2
1024s
(1¡ ®)fÁ= 7
8
(®);
where
fÁ= 7
8
(®) ´ ªÁ= 7
8
(®)¡£Á= 7
8
(®);
and
ªÁ= 7
8
(®) ´ 13
p
169 + 50®+ 169®2;
£Á= 7
8
(®) ´ 27®+ 171:
In addition, we can show that fÁ= 7
8
(0) = ¡2 < 0, fÁ= 7
8
(1) = 13
p
388¡198 >
0,
ª0
Á= 7
8
(®) =
13(169®+ 25)p
169 + 50®+ 169®2
> 0;
and
ª00
Á= 7
8
(®) =
13[(13)4 ¡ 54]
(169 + 50®+ 169®2)
3
2
> 0:
If ®=1, we can ¯nd that ¦TotalR2 (s) = ¦
Total
NR (s). If 0 · ® < 1, the value of
¦TotalR2 (s) ¡ ¦TotalNR (s) has the same sign as the value of fÁ= 7
8
(®). Because of
the properties of fÁ= 7
8
(®), ªÁ= 7
8
(®) and £Á= 7
8
(®) summarized above, we can
show that there exists a unique ®^Á= 7
8
2 (0; 1) that satis¯es the condition that
fÁ= 7
8
(®) · 0 if ® · ®^Á= 7
8
, and fÁ= 7
8
(®) ¸ 0 if ® ¸ ®^Á= 7
8
and fÁ= 7
8
(®^Á= 7
8
) = 0.
Therefore, the R&D investment under the R (NR) regime is higher than or
equal to that under the NR (R) regime, if ® ¸ (·)®^Á= 7
8
.
3)From Results 3-1 and 3-2, fÁ= 3
4
(®) is monotonically increasing in ®
at 8 ® 2 (0; 1) and fÁ= 3
4
(0) = ¡2 < 0, fÁ= 3
4
(1) = 2 > 0. fÁ= 7
8
(®) is
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also monotonically increasing in ® at 8 ® 2 (0; 1) and fÁ= 7
8
(0) = ¡2 < 0,
fÁ= 7
8
(1) = 13
p
388¡ 198 > 0. Thus, suppose there exists 9 ¶® 2 (0; 1) which
satis¯es the condition that fÁ= 3
4
(¶®) < (>)0 and fÁ= 7
8
(¶®) > (<)0, we can
show that the condition ®^Á= 3
4
> ®^Á= 7
8
(®^Á= 3
4
< ®^Á= 7
8
) holds. By introducing
® = 0:4 into fÁ= 3
4
(®) and fÁ= 7
8
(®), we can ¯nd that fÁ= 3
4
(0:4) = ¡1:3168 < 0
and fÁ= 7
8
(0:4) = 9:2779 > 0. Therefore, we can show that the value of ®^Á= 7
8
is smaller than the value of ®^Á= 3
4
.
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 2
1) From Propositions 1-1 and 1-2, the condition ¦TotalNR (s) ¸ ¦TotalR (s) 8s
holds in the Case 1 and Case 2 regions. Thus, we can show that
¦TotalNR (s) ¸ ¦TotalR (s) 8s
¦TotalNR (s)¡ C(s) ¸ ¦TotalR (s)¡ C(s) 8s
^¦NR(s) ¸ ¦^R(s) 8s
^¦NR(sR) ¸ ¦^R(sR)
^¦NR(sNR) ¸ ^¦NR(sR) ¸ ¦^R(sR):
Therefore, the net total pro¯t of the domestic ¯rm under the NR regime
¦^NR(sNR) is higher than or equal to that under the R regime ¦^R(sR).
2) From Proposition 1-3, the condition ¦TotalNR (s) · ¦TotalR (s) 8s holds in
the Case 3 region. Thus, we can show that
¦TotalNR (s) · ¦TotalR (s) 8s
¦TotalNR (s)¡ C(s) · ¦TotalR (s)¡ C(s) 8s
^¦NR(s) · ¦^R(s) 8s
^¦NR(sNR) · ¦^R(sNR)
^¦NR(sNR) · ¦^R(sNR) · ¦^R(sR):
Therefore, the net total pro¯t of the domestic ¯rm under the R regime ¦^R(sR)
is higher than or equal to that under the NR regime ¦^NR(sNR).
Appendix H: Proof of Lemma 2
From Equations (7) and (20), the condition CSHR (s) ¸ CSHNR(s) 8s holds, if
PR(s) · PHNR(s) 8s. Moreover, from Equations (8) and (21), the condition
CSFR(s) · CSFNR(s) 8s holds, if PR(s) ¸ P FNR(s) 8s.
1) When Á <
p
2 ¡ 1, from Equations (1) and (12), we can ¯nd that
PR1(s) = P
H
NR(s) 8s. In addition, from Equations (4) and (12), we can
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¯nd the condition PR1(s) ¸ P FNR(s) 8s holds. Thus, we can con¯rm that
the conditions CSHR (s) = CS
H
NR(s) 8s and CSFR(s) · CSFNR(s) 8s hold
simultaneously.
2) When Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1, PR2(s) is a decreasing function of ® at ® 2 [0; 1].
Thus, the condition PR2(s) · (1+Á)sT4 8s holds, since (1+Á)sT4 is the value
of PR2(s) when ® = 0. In addition, from Equation (1), we can easily con-
¯rm that the condition PR2(s) · (1+Á)sT4 · PHNR(s) holds. Moreover, from
Equations (4) and (16), we can show that
PR2(s)¡ P FNR(s) =
sT
8
­
¸ 0
where
­ ´ (1 + ®)(1 + Á)¡
p
(1 + ®)2(1 + Á)2 ¡ 8[®+ (1¡ ®)2Á(1 + Á)]:
Thus, we can con¯rm that the conditions CSHR (s) ¸ CSHNR(s) and CSFR(s) ·
CSFNR(s) hold simultaneously.
Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 3
1) In the Case 1 region (when Á <
p
2 ¡ 1), the condition SR1 · SNR
holds from Proposition 1. From Lemma 2-1, we can show that the condi-
tion CSHR1(s) = CS
H
NR(s) 8s holds. Thus, noting that both CSHR1(s) and
CSHNR(s) are increasing function of s, we can con¯rm that the condition
CSHR1(SR1) · CSHNR(SNR) holds. In addition, from Equations (8) and (21),
we can easily con¯rm that the condition CSFR(SR1) = 0 · CSFNR(SNR) holds.
2) In the Case 2 region, the condition SR2 · SNR holds by de¯nition.
From Lemma 2-2, we can show that the condition CSHR2(s) ¸ CSHNR(s) 8s
holds. Thus, noting that both CSHR2(s) and CS
H
NR(s) are an increasing
function of s, it is ambiguous whether CSHR2(SR2) is higher or lower than
CSHNR(SNR).
In addition, from Lemma 2-2, we can show that the condition CSFR2(s) ·
CSFNR(s) 8s holds. Thus, noting that both CSFR2(s) and CSHNR(s) are an
increasing function of s, we can con¯rm that the condition CSFR2(SR2) ·
CSFNR(SNR) holds.
3) In the Case 3 region, the condition SR2 ¸ SNR holds by de¯nition.
From Lemma 2-2, we can show that the condition CSHR2(s) ¸ CSHNR(s) 8s
holds. Thus, noting that both CSHR2(s) and CS
H
NR(s) are an increasing func-
tion of s, we can con¯rm that the condition CSHR2(SR2) ¸ CSHNR(SNR) holds.
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In addition, from Lemma 2-2, we can ¯nd that the condition CSFR2(s) ·
CSFNR(s) 8s holds. Thus, noting that both CSFR2(s) and CSHNR(s) are an
increasing function of s, it is ambiguous whether CSFR2(SR2) is higher or lower
than CSFNR(SNR).
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Table 1 The difference in R&D investment between the R regime and NR regime 
(SR-SNR) 
    
?  Φ=0 Φ=0.1 Φ=0.2 Φ=0.3 Φ=0.4 Φ=0.5 Φ=0.6 Φ=0.7 Φ=0.8 Φ=0.9 Φ=1 
α=0 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00  0.00
α=0.1 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00  0.00
α=0.2 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00   0.00 0.00
α=0.3 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00   0.01 0.01
α=0.4 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00   0.01 0.01
α=0.5 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00   0.01 0.02
α=0.6 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01   0.01 0.02
α=0.7 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00    0.01 0.02 0.02
α=0.8 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00    0.01 0.01 0.02
α=0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00    0.00 0.01 0.01
α=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-1 The difference in the consumer surplus of the home country between the R regime and the NR regime when 
β=3.1    
 
?  Φ=0 Φ=0.1 Φ=0.2 Φ=0.3 Φ=0.4 Φ=0.5 Φ=0.6 Φ=0.7 Φ=0.8 Φ=0.9 Φ=1 
α=0 0.00 -0.05 -0.22 -0.48 -0.84 6.19 5.29 4.20 2.94 1.54  0.00
α=0.1 0.00 -0.05 -0.21 -0.48 -0.83 6.96 6.40 5.53 4.43 3.16  1.73
α=0.2 0.00 -0.05 -0.21 -0.46 -0.81 7.75 7.56 6.95 6.08   4.99 3.74
α=0.3 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 -0.44 -0.77 8.54 8.75 8.45 7.85   7.02 5.99
α=0.4 0.00 -0.05 -0.18 -0.40 -0.71 9.35 9.96 10.01 9.72   9.19 8.46
α=0.5 0.00 -0.04 -0.16 -0.36 -0.64 10.17 11.19 11.59 11.65   11.47 11.08
α=0.6 0.00 -0.03 -0.14 -0.31 -0.54 11.00 12.40 13.17 13.59   13.78 13.77
α=0.7 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 -0.25 -0.44 11.83 13.61 14.71    15.48 16.03 16.41
α=0.8 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 -0.18 -0.31 12.67 14.77 16.18    17.24 18.11 18.82
α=0.9 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.16 13.50 15.89 17.52    18.79 19.85 20.78
α=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.33 16.94 18.68    20.00 21.06 21.94
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-2 The difference in the consumer surplus of the foreign country between the R regime and the NR regime β=3.1   
?  Φ=0 Φ=0.1 Φ=0.2 Φ=0.3 Φ=0.4 Φ=0.5 Φ=0.6 Φ=0.7 Φ=0.8 Φ=0.9 Φ=1 
α=0 0.00 -0.12 -0.47 -1.07 -1.97 -2.43 -2.71 -2.66 -2.22 -1.34  0.00
α=0.1 0.00 -0.14 -0.57 -1.30 -2.38 -2.94 -3.33 -3.43 -3.20 -2.60  -1.61
α=0.2 0.00 -0.17 -0.67 -1.55 -2.83 -3.48 -3.99 -4.24 -4.21   -3.87 -3.21
α=0.3 0.00 -0.19 -0.79 -1.81 -3.31 -4.06 -4.68 -5.07 -5.23   -5.13 -4.77
α=0.4 0.00 -0.23 -0.91 -2.09 -3.82 -4.68 -5.40 -5.92 -6.24   -6.35 -6.25
α=0.5 0.00 -0.26 -1.05 -2.39 -4.35 -5.31 -6.13 -6.77 -7.23   -7.51 -7.62
α=0.6 0.00 -0.29 -1.19 -2.71 -4.92 -5.97 -6.88 -7.61 -8.19   -8.60 -8.86
α=0.7 0.00 -0.33 -1.34 -3.05 -5.50 -6.64 -7.61 -8.43    -9.08 -9.59 -9.95
α=0.8 0.00 -0.37 -1.50 -3.39 -6.10 -7.30 -8.33 -9.19    -9.90 -10.47 -10.90
α=0.9 0.00 -0.41 -1.66 -3.75 -6.71 -7.96 -9.01 -9.89    -10.63 -11.23 -11.71
α=1 0.00 -0.46 -1.83 -4.13 -7.33 -8.60 -9.63 -10.50    -11.24 -11.88 -12.44
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-1 The difference in the consumer surplus of the home country between the R regime and the NR regime β=1.1   
?  Φ=0 Φ=0.1 Φ=0.2 Φ=0.3 Φ=0.4 Φ=0.5 Φ=0.6 Φ=0.7 Φ=0.8 Φ=0.9 Φ=1 
α=0 0.00 -0.21 -0.97 -2.76 -6.89 -8.56 -9.38 -2.92 19.97 55.17 0.00 
α=0.1 0.00 -0.21 -0.96 -2.72 -6.77 -7.89 -6.89 5.71 48.28 143.37 261.48 
α=0.2 0.00 -0.20 -0.92 -2.60 -6.41 -6.75 -3.73 15.16 78.15 239.45  566.12
α=0.3 0.00 -0.19 -0.87 -2.42 -5.84 -5.27 -0.42 23.05 100.01 308.73  798.45
α=0.4 0.00 -0.18 -0.79 -2.17 -5.11 -3.60 2.49 27.51 106.85   325.33 867.32
α=0.5 0.00 -0.16 -0.69 -1.86 -4.25 -1.91 4.62 27.76 97.15   284.83 754.57
α=0.6 0.00 -0.13 -0.58 -1.52 -3.33 -0.36 5.75 24.28 75.29   206.24 524.59
α=0.7 0.00 -0.11 -0.45 -1.14 -2.40 0.90 5.91 18.54 49.19   120.86 283.06
α=0.8 0.00 -0.07 -0.31 -0.76 -1.52 1.81 5.29 12.28 26.46   54.97 111.66
α=0.9 0.00 -0.04 -0.16 -0.37 -0.70 2.34 4.21 6.96 11.25   18.02 28.80
α=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.52 2.98 3.29 3.52   3.71 3.86
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2 The difference in the consumer surplus of the foreign country between the R regime and the NR regime when 
β=1.1  
 
?  Φ=0 Φ=0.1 Φ=0.2 Φ=0.3 Φ=0.4 Φ=0.5 Φ=0.6 Φ=0.7 Φ=0.8 Φ=0.9 Φ=1 
α=0 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.43 -1.42 -4.29 -11.92 -29.11 -58.70 -81.68 0.00 
α=0.1 0.00 -0.03 -0.14 -0.52 -1.70 -5.08 -14.11 -35.09 -75.37 -130.48 -151.43 
α=0.2 0.00 -0.03 -0.17 -0.60 -1.94 -5.68 -15.48 -38.08 -81.74 -143.78  -177.09
α=0.3 0.00 -0.04 -0.20 -0.67 -2.13 -6.00 -15.77 -37.52 -77.20 -124.38  -101.63
α=0.4 0.00 -0.04 -0.22 -0.74 -2.23 -5.98 -14.94 -33.65 -64.37   -87.13 5.24
α=0.5 0.00 -0.05 -0.24 -0.79 -2.26 -5.64 -13.11 -27.46 -47.71   -50.01 74.76
α=0.6 0.00 -0.06 -0.27 -0.81 -2.19 -5.00 -10.63 -20.31 -31.59   -24.55 81.33
α=0.7 0.00 -0.06 -0.29 -0.82 -2.05 -4.17 -7.91 -13.52 -18.79   -12.04 47.92
α=0.8 0.00 -0.07 -0.30 -0.81 -1.83 -3.24 -5.34 -8.01 -10.07   -7.10 13.77
α=0.9 0.00 -0.07 -0.31 -0.78 -1.57 -2.32 -3.22 -4.16 -4.81   -4.40 -1.20
α=1 0.00 -0.08 -0.32 -0.73 -1.29 -1.51 -1.70 -1.85 -1.98   -2.09 -2.19
 
 
